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Abstract 
 
 
Do investors always allocate their attention properly? If not, what potentially drives 
investors inattention? This paper shows that work schedule can have an influence on 
the level of attention investors pay. Using the introduction of the five-day workweek 
system in financial sector of Korea in 2002 as a natural experiment, the paper suggests 
work schedule can be a key factor driving investor inattention to Friday earnings 
announcements. Our stock return analyses show stronger immediate response and 
weaker delayed response to Friday news under the six-day workweek system. The 
trend was, however, reversed under the five-day workweek system, showing more 
sluggish immediate response and stronger delayed response to Friday earnings 
announcements. These findings state that the trade-off between weekend distraction 
and additional working hours during weekend determines investors attention to Friday 
earnings announcements. 
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1 Introduction 
Does work schedule affect people's attention across days of a week? Can this happen 
even in the most efficient place such as a stock market? Though measuring attention is a difficult 
job, we can still find substantial examples which strategically use people’s differential attention 
across days of a week. For example, it is conventional wisdom that companies save layoff notice 
until Friday because workers would have a weekend to absorb the emotional shock. Similarly, 
companies and central banks release bad news mostly on Friday to abate the market response to 
negative news. All of these examples indicate that people's attention to market is unevenly 
distributed across days of a week. 
While there are recent papers on the Friday effect in financial market, there is relatively 
little research on the underlying mechanism. Bagnoli et al (2005) find that there is a sluggish 
initial response to Friday earnings news and Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) show that the weekend 
distraction causes investors inattention to Friday earnings news.  
This paper attempts to show one of the underlying sources of inattention induced by the 
weekend distraction is a workweek system using the unique natural experiment in Korea: 
transition from the six-day workweek system to the five-day workweek system. Korea adopted 
the five-day workweek system in financial sectors in 2002 and it provides us an opportunity to 
observe the relationship between workweek schedule and investor response on Friday news. We 
find that there is less attention to Friday earnings announcements under the five-day workweek 
system and there is more attention to Friday earnings announcements under the six-day 
workweek system. These support our claim that work schedule has an influence on investors 
attention across days of a week. 
People have limited capacity of attention which they allocate properly in making 
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economic decisions. Because of this limited capacity of attention, people allocate their attention 
considering the cost of paying attention. For instance, when people are at work, the cost of 
attention is relatively low and thus they can pay more attention to their work efficiently because 
there is less distraction. When they have other chores which can potentially distract them, 
however, they cannot pay enough attention to their work because the cost of attention is 
relatively high. 
Under the five-day workweek schedule, investors are distracted by weekends and it is 
difficult to pay sufficient attention to earnings announcements released on Friday even though 
they have two more days to analyze the news. Under the six-day workweek schedule, however, 
investors can allocate more attention to earnings news released on Fridays, because investors 
have whole Saturday morning additionally to review the earnings announcements without any 
disruption in the office.  Hence, earnings news released on Friday virtually receives more 
attention than earnings news released on other weekdays under the six-day workweek system. 
This finding states that even though the same amount of time is given to process earnings 
information, the allocation of attention to Friday earnings news would vary according to the 
workweek system.  
Our study owes its basic concepts of investor inattention to the existing literature in 
behavioral finance. Bernard and Thomas (1989) examine two alternative explanations for 
post-earnings-announcement drift: risk-premium adjustment and delayed price response. They 
conclude that much of their data is consistent with the delayed response hypothesis rather than 
the risk-premium hypothesis. Their findings suggest that some investors at least temporarily 
neglect the information contained in earnings surprise. Also, theoretical models were developed 
to explain bounded rationality of investors and post-earnings-announcement drift in stock market. 
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Hong and Stein (1999) construct the model which shows that investors' cognitive limit causes 
under-reaction to information in the short-run while momentum traders' strategy will lead 
overreaction in the long run. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) offer an analytical model of financial 
reporting when investors have limited attention and information processing power. Their model 
implies that informationally equivalent disclosures by firms can have different effects on investor 
perceptions depending on the form of presentation. 
In addition, there have been many empirical studies on investor inattention to earnings 
announcements in several circumstances. Barber and Odean (2008) demonstrate that investors 
buy attention-grabbing stocks and argue that investors have limited attention and allocate it to 
stocks with more salient features. Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) test whether there is more 
sluggish response to earnings announcements on days with more relevant earnings news. Their 
results show that there is less immediate response when the number of relevant announcements is 
greater. Their findings can be explained by competition for investors' attention between a firm's 
earnings disclosures. Cheng et al (2015) show that low-attention leads to greater underreaction to 
repurchase announcements. Furthermore, Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts (2005) reexamine the 
conventional wisdom that after-hours and Friday earnings announcements tend to be negative 
news. Their analyses show that strategic release of earnings news on Friday has not ended by 
removal of barriers of media coverage in the mid-1990s.  
Our study is most inspired by the paper by Dellavigna and Pollet (2009). In their work, 
they found strong evidence in stock returns and trading volume to support the hypothesis that 
there is investor inattention to Friday earnings news due to weekend distraction. Dellavigna and 
Pollet, however, do not fully discuss the trade-off between additional two days and distraction 
during weekends for Friday inattention and conclude that weekends distract the investors and 
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cause less attention to Friday news even though they have two more days to analyze the 
information. Our work is in line with Dellavigna and Pollet by showing that allocation of 
attention according to work schedule is a key factor of weekend distraction driving investors' 
inattention to earnings announcements released on Friday. Therefore, our results contribute to the 
existing literature by showing that work schedule can affect the cost of attention and thus lead 
investor inattention to the news. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe our data set and the five-day 
workweek system of Korea in detail. In section 3, we briefly discuss whether earnings news 
released on Friday and non-Friday are comparable. No systematic differences in firm size are 
found in our sample except that firms maximizing short-term share value release negative 
(positive) news on the days with high (low) distraction. For instance, under the six-day 
workweek system, firms release good news on Friday when investors pay more attention. On the 
other hand, firms announce worse earnings on Friday when investors pay less attention. In 
section 4, we present immediate and delayed stock return responses to earnings announcements. 
Our estimated results indicate that there exists more initial reaction to Friday earnings news 
under the six day workweek system and less initial reaction under the five-day workweek system. 
The more initial reaction (or less initial reaction) to Friday earnings news was followed by 
smaller post earnings announcement drift (or larger post earnings announcement drift) 
subsequently.  
We also test responsiveness of trading volume in section 5. We found out the evidence 
of attenuated abnormal volume corresponding to less immediate stock return responsiveness 
around the earnings announcement day. The volume results suggest that less immediate response 
in stock return was driven by investor inattention rather than disagreement on earnings news or 
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less accurate forecasts. We discuss alternative explanations in section 6. Three possible 
explanations are considered: after-market announcements, pre-announcement release and firm 
heterogeneity. We examine why none of these theories can fully explain our empirical evidence. 
Section 7 concludes the paper with summary of our inference. 
 
2 The Introduction of Five-Day Workweek System in Korea 
It is no doubt that the adoption of the five-day workweek system in Korea was one of 
the major social changes in Korea during the last two decades. Not only did it raise political 
struggle among government, labor, and business before its enactment, it also drew attention from 
both academia and business about its extensive effect on the workers’ life pattern and 
productivity.  
The gradual reduction of legal working hours has been under way over two decades in 
Korea. Since it was legislated as 48 hours in 1953, there was first attempt in 2000 which 
decreased legal weekly working hours to 40 hours, and following attempt in 2003 led gradual 
adoption of working week of 40 hours. As in other European countries, reduction of working 
hours aimed to increase job sharing and employment. However, its introduction also faced strong 
backlash from corporations which concerned decrease in productivity along with increased labor 
cost.  
<Table 1 to be Inserted Here> 
Table 1 shows phased decrease in working hours across firms and industries. This paper 
focuses on voluntary introduction of working week of 40 hours in non-banking financial sector 
in November 2002. Finance sector and its union agreed to reduce weekly working hours to 40 
hours two years prior to its legislation. Even though it was the 40-hour workweek system in legal 
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parlance, it virtually changed the six day workweek system to the five-day workweek system and 
involved the noticeable change in the weekly life pattern of all affected workers. 
<Figure 1A and Figure 1B to be Inserted Here> 
Figure1A and Figure 1B show that the introduction of five-day workweek system 
significantly reduced the number of monthly working days and hours in finance and insurance 
industry, without such clear impact on total working hours compared to those of other major 
industries. The similar results are confirmed by Yang and Geum (2009) whose study analyzed 
Korean Labor Panel to investigate the impact of five-day work week system on the number of 
working days and working hours of affected workers. The total working hour shows steady 
decrease over time, but no distinct reduction right after the introduction of policy. It is suggested 
that workers’ preference of income over leisure or partial enforcement of law might have caused 
these trends.  
Nevertheless, it is reported that two-day long weekend changed various aspects of 
workers’ lives. Yang and Geum (2009) reported increased leisure time with no change in 
expenditure for leisure. A study by Kim, Kim, and Kim (2003) analyzed the sample of financial 
sector workers to investigate the impact of five-day workweek system on their time allocation. 
The workers under five-day workweek system spent more time and money, and they were also 
more likely to spend it with their family. Various consumer reports also showed change in 
shopping or TV ratings across days of a week. All these findings consistently illustrate that the 
workweek system significantly affected people's weekly routine.  
Workers under the five-day workweek system allocate their attention to work in 
different way compared to workers under six-day workweek system. And the effect of new 
workweek system on workers in financial sector would be different from that of workers at the 
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production lines at automobile factory. Workers at financial sector such as analysts, institutional 
investors, and fund managers work with information coming from the market every day; they 
analyze, interpret, and respond to those information. Since market sends information 
continuously over time, their attention to information issued during the weekend can be affected 
by the change in their work schedule. We propose that investors hired by financial institutes 
would show different response to market information under two different workweek systems as 
their allocation of attention changes according to work schedule.  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
3.1 Data and Variables Construction 
Korea Exchange (KRX) was ranked as the world's top 12 stock exchanges by value of 
shares traded in 2007. It is definitely one of the most active emerging markets in the world with 
1757 companies listed by December 31, 2007. Korea Exchange adopted electronic 
announcement system (KIND) in April 1999, only second to the United States, to fairly provide 
information to all investors. The system simplified the submission process of all disclosures and 
facilitated information diffusion among investors. KRX also implemented Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (FD) in November, 2002 to prevent firms from selectively offering information to 
analysts and brokers. It is reported that market response became more salient after the 
introduction of FD which implies that information leakage before earnings news was decreased. 
In this study, we analyze investor reaction to earnings announcements data drawn from 
three sources: earnings announcements data from Bloomberg, earnings forecasts data from 
FnGuide, the largest company in Korea collecting and publishing various financial data, and 
stock returns and trading volume from the Korea Exchange. We chose Bloomberg because they 
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provide reliable and up to date financial data and news from all over the world. We also manually 
checked the Bloomberg data and KIND reports to guarantee the reliability of information2. All 
quarterly earnings announcements from Bloomberg were matched with earnings forecasts in 
FnGuide. Our data covers the period from 2000 to 20011 when all earnings announcements were 
supposed to be submitted through KIND, the online system.  
The earnings forecast data includes earnings forecasts by individual analysts from 47 
brokerage firms from 2000 to 2011.3 The consensus forecast is defined as the median forecast 
among all the analysts who made forecasts. If an analyst made multiple forecasts, we chose only 
the most recent one. We restricted the sample to forecasts made within the 90 calendar days 
before the earnings announcements to make it a reliable proxy for the true expectations of 
market. 
We combined earnings announcement and forecast data with actual earnings, stock 
returns and trading volumes from KRX. Cumulative abnormal returns around each 
announcement date is calculated based on a regression using past stock returns before the 
announcement date. Let 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘 denote the stock return of company k on day t, and let 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡,𝑚𝑚 
denote the market return on day t. Then we obtain ?̂?𝛽𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 for company k in quarter q, using the 
regression 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘 =∝𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘+ 𝛽𝛽𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡,𝑚𝑚  for days t from τ − 300 to τ − 46, where τ indicate the 
announcement date. Then, we calculated abnormal return according to Dellavigna and Pollet 
(2009):  
                                                   
2 We found out significant discrepancy in early years of data. We assumed that KIND data is more correct and 
changed all discrepancy of data until 2002. After 2002, the rate of discrepancy fell significantly and we assumed 
we can take such amount of measurement error.  
3 Before 2003, forecast data exists only for each company's 4th quarters. Even though estimates are for annual 
forecasts, since analysts made a forecast after companies announced the 3rd quarter earnings, we treated this 
information as equivalent to quarterly earnings forecasts. 
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𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 = [ � (1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘)]− 1 − ?̂?𝛽𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘[� �1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚� − 1]𝜏𝜏+𝐻𝐻
𝑗𝑗=𝜏𝜏+ℎ
𝜏𝜏+𝐻𝐻
𝑗𝑗=𝜏𝜏+ℎ
 
for company k in quarter q. The abnormal return will be used as indicator of investor reaction 
following earnings announcements.  
For analyses throughout the paper, we define earnings surprise as the difference between 
actual earnings announced and the consensus earnings forecast, normalized by the stock price 
(Kothari 2001)4. Let 𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 denote actual earnings per share announced in quarter q for company 
k, and let ?̂?𝑒𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 denote median earnings forecast made for company k in quarter q. Then earnings 
surprise is constructed as 𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 = 𝑒𝑒𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘−?̂?𝑒𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘   , where 𝑃𝑃𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 is the price of the shares of company k 
five trading days before the announcement date in quarter q. 
<Table 2 to be Inserted Here> 
 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 shows the distribution of earnings announcements collected by Bloomberg, 
across days of a week. The distribution shows that almost half of earnings announcements are 
released either in the beginning of the week or the end of weekdays. Weekend earnings 
announcements account for about 5% in general. Under the six-day workweek system, Friday 
earnings announcements are over-represented, because data of this period mostly contains 4th 
quarter earnings announcements. There was a convention to announce 4th quarter earnings 
announcement on Friday to make it easy to hold annual meeting of shareholders at the same time. 
The concentration of 4th quarter earnings announcements on Fridays become weaker as firms 
                                                   
4 Korean firms started to move from Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2009. We matched forecast and actual earnings according to each 
accounting standard. 
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release pre-earnings announcements ahead of shareholder meeting in later years.  
Our basic sample matched earnings announcement data with earnings forecast, returns, 
and other control variables. We eliminated observations with missing earnings surprise, either 
with no recent forecast or actual earnings data. We excluded penny stocks with values lower than 
1000 won5 since their price could be excessively volatile because of speculative investors. 
Announcements made on Saturday, Sunday or holidays are also omitted from the sample. Finally, 
outliers in earning surprise are excluded to prevent bias caused by unusual situation. 
<Table 3 to be Inserted Here> 
To ensure unbiased estimate of investor reaction, the average characteristics of 
announcements released on Friday and other weekdays should have no systematic differences. 
Such bias can be caused by sample selection or firms’ strategic announcement behavior. We 
compare average characteristics of earnings announcements on Fridays and other weekdays in 
Table 3. To make it comparable over time, we decide to use quantile of each character calculated 
within each quarter rather than absolute measures. Then, for each announcement date, we 
compute average characteristics of announcements that investors face. 
<Figure 2 to be Inserted Here> 
Table 3 shows that basic sample contains 17 Fridays and 42 other weekdays under the 
six-day workweek system. From the perspective of investors, average earnings announcements 
released on Friday and non-Fridays are pretty much equivalent. Figure 2 also shows that the 
distributions of average size of companies in each earnings surprise quantiles are quite similar 
across announcement day and workweek system. However, under the five-day workweek system, 
                                                   
5 Two thousand won is approximately equal to two US dollars. We lowered criterion to be one thousand won 
when we examine delayed and long-run responses since these accumulated returns are less likely to be affected 
by temporary volatility in stock price.  
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there is a statistically significant difference in terms of average earnings surprises released on 
Friday and other weekdays; Friday announcements are on average more negative compared to 
non-Friday announcements. It suggests that firms with negative earnings shock might choose 
Friday to mitigate the shock on purpose. On the other hand, under the six-day workweek system, 
Friday announcements are more positive because managers would want to use investors attention 
strategically. We would further discuss strategic firm behavior when we interpret our results in 
later chapters.  
 
4. The Evidence from Stock Returns 
In this chapter, we investigate the sensitivity of stock returns to earnings news across 
weekdays under the two different workweek regimes. We employ stock return responses to 
earnings surprises in the short run and the long run as a measure of immediate inattention and 
later catch-up. If investors are more distracted by longer weekends under the reduced workweek 
system, then we should observe less immediate responses to Friday announcements relative to 
that of other weekdays. The less immediate responses will be accompanied by more delayed 
responses over time as investors realize their under-reaction and adjust stock price. Our DDD 
(Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences) strategy tests the hypothesis that relative response to 
Friday earnings news in the short run is more sluggish under the five-day workweek system. 
Accordingly long-run response to Friday earnings news would be relatively higher under the new 
regime compared to old workweek system.  
To construct a measure of earnings surprises, we divided earnings surprises into nine 
groups by magnitude. Negative earnings surprises are included in quantiles 1 through 4, followed 
by zero surprises in quantile 5. Zero surprises are defined as earnings surprises whose absolute 
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values are smaller than 0.002. Positive surprises are included in quantiles 6 through 9. The 
thresholds for each quantile are computed separately for each quarter.  
 
4.1 Identification Strategy Using Top and Bottom Quantiles 
In this section, we show our estimation strategy using very positive earnings news (top 
two quantiles) and very negative earnings news (bottom two quantiles). Then, we compare the 
differences in Friday sensitivity under two different workweek systems in terms of immediate, 
delayed and long-term responses. Following simple DDD strategy estimate differential Friday 
effect under the two different workweek systems: 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞(𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘)(ℎ,𝐻𝐻) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤      (1) +𝛽𝛽6𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 + Γ0𝑋𝑋𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 + Γ1𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑋𝑋𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 
 
, where 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘(ℎ,𝐻𝐻)  denotes cumulative abnormal return for the time period (τ + h, τ+H) after 
announcement day τ  for company k in quarter q.  This regression uses only the top and 
bottom quantiles and 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  is an indicator equal to 1 if the observation belongs to the top 
quantiles. A dummy variable 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹  denotes whether the announcement was released on Friday 
(𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 = 1) or not (𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 = 0).  An indicator 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤  represents five-day workweek system (𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 =1) or six-day workweek (𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 = 0), at the time of the earnings announcements release.  
In this equation fixed effects controls for difference in stock returns between top and 
bottom quantiles (𝛽𝛽1), time-invariant difference in stock returns to Friday earnings news (𝛽𝛽2), 
and change in overall stock returns after the adoption of the new workweek system (𝛽𝛽3). The 
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second-level interactions capture difference in top-minus-bottom stock responses to Friday 
earnings news and non-Friday earnings news (𝛽𝛽4 ), the change in responses to Friday 
announcements over time (𝛽𝛽5), and change in differential stock returns to top quantile news 
relative to bottom quantile news over time (𝛽𝛽6). We are interested in the coefficient of the 
third-level interaction (𝛽𝛽7) which captures the change in stock return sensitivity to Friday 
earnings announcements (relative to non-Friday earnings announcements) under the five- day 
workweek system (relative to the six day workweek system). Under our hypothesis that five-day 
workweek system induces investor inattention to Friday earnings news, we expect to estimate 
negative 𝛽𝛽7 for immediate returns, 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘(0,1). As investors realize their under-reactions to earnings 
news released on Fridays, they would show greater response later in time and it will be captured 
by positive 𝛽𝛽7  for delayed returns, 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘(2,55).   
We also include a set of controls 𝑋𝑋𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 in our specification. Monthly dummy variables 
are included to control time trends and differences between early and late announcements within 
a quarter. It is also possible that stock responsiveness and company size are related if large 
companies draw more attention from investors. Therefore, we control for decile of number of 
employees and market capitalization as proxy variables for company size. To construct the decile 
of market capitalization and employee size, we divide firms into ten groups according to 
variables within each quarter of our sample period. The indicator of KSE/KOSDAQ is included 
since those two markets have different type of firms, IPO process and regulating body. We also 
added interaction term between all included control variables and indicator of top quantile to 
capture differential response to earnings surprises according to different characteristics of firms 
and markets. Finally, standard errors are clustered by day of announcement in all regressions to 
allow correlations of stock returns on the same day.  
16 
 
 
Additionally, we also included the set of dummy variables indicating each decile of 
number of announcements released on the same day in several regressions to check robustness of 
results. This variable is constructed from the original Bloomberg data to calculate the amount of 
earnings news released on each day. The breakpoints of decile are determined within each 
quarter to make it comparable across time. In our data, the portion of earnings announcements on 
Friday is higher than that on other weekdays in general. The estimated coefficient to measure 
Friday inattention could be biased if the number of announcements is a real factor driving 
investor inattention. Controlling the number of announcements in the regression would control 
potential bias from investor distraction caused by the amount of earnings information released 
each day. 
 
4.2 Immediate Response Results using Top and Bottom Quantiles 
<Table 4 to be Inserted Here> 
Table 4 demonstrates regression results using 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘(0,1)  as a dependent variable. The 
dependent variable 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘(0,1) measures return from the closing of the market on the day before the 
announcement to the closing of the market on the day after the announcement to include stock 
price movement to after-market announcements. Since the size of immediate return is usually 
very small, we applied stricter rule of sample and excluded volatile stocks whose price is less 
than 2,000 won. Regression (1) and (2) covers period from 2000 to 2011 while regression (3) and 
(4) used data between 2000 and 2008 to prevent any bias coming from subprime shock on the 
stock market.   
Regression (1) shows that the abnormal return to top quantile is very small and 
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insignificant if announcements are made on non-Friday under the six day workweek system. We 
interpret that average response to those news are not strong enough to dominate other influences 
affecting stock market. Estimation shows that top-to-bottom returns for Friday earnings news is 
significantly higher than that for other weekdays (𝛽𝛽4=0.026) under the six day workweek system. 
This finding is consistent over all regressions. However, the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient of the three-way interaction term demonstrates that the five-day workweek system not 
only eliminates the positive top-to-bottom return differential for Friday earnings news under the 
six day workweek system, but also brings about lower top-to-bottom returns for Friday earnings 
news (𝛽𝛽7=-0.034)  under the five-day workweek system. The change in top-to-bottom return 
differentials for Friday earnings announcements is significant at 1% in regression (1) and 
remains almost the same (𝛽𝛽7=-0.034) when we control for the number of announcements in 
regression (2).  
Results using the pre-subprime period also show similar estimates in regression (3) and 
(4). Though immediate response to non-Friday earnings news is insignificant, estimated 
coefficient 𝛽𝛽4  shows that there is significantly more immediate response to Friday earnings 
announcements under the six day workweek system. The three-way interaction show that the 
new workweek system changed differential stock return for the top minus the bottom quantiles 
for Friday earnings news at the 1% significance level. The magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients is slightly of bigger size than regression (1) and (2). In sum, all these estimates are 
consistent over different specifications and support our hypothesis that the workweek system 
determines the direction of differential immediate response to Friday earnings announcements.  
 
4.3. Delayed and Long-Run Responses using Top and Bottom Quantiles 
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<Table 5 to be Inserted Here> 
In Table 5, we examined delayed and long-run responses to examine the movement of 
post-earnings announcement drift and overall effect. In order to examine post-earnings 
announcement drift, we choose 55 trading days window after the announcement day, which is 
slightly shorter than 90 calendar days. This is to solve the problem that our estimated result being 
diluted by various pre-announcements which are usually released several weeks before the new 
earnings announcement. Firms who are delisted later were excluded from our sample since their 
later return are more likely to be affected by bad news related to delisting rather than earnings 
news announced much earlier.  
In regressions (1)-(4) of Table 5, the estimated results show that there is significant and 
large magnitude of post-earnings announcement drift for the announcements released on 
non-Friday under the six day workweek system. It also shows that top-to-bottom post earnings 
announcement drift is lower for Friday earnings announcements under the six day workweek 
system.  The estimated effect is statistically significant only when we control the number of 
announcements, but the sign and the magnitude is noticeable. Also, this result is consistent with 
the result we acquired using immediate stock returns. Higher delayed response is followed by 
lower immediate response, which confirms that earlier finding is not caused by the 
characteristics of earnings news, but inattention caused by workweek system. The estimated 
coefficient of a three-way interaction term also presents a significant change in differential post 
earnings announcement drift to Friday earnings news under the five-day workweek system. The 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient is large and significant across different specifications and 
sample periods. Results from delayed responses demonstrate that the movement of post earnings 
announcement drift is coherent with that of immediate responses and thereby support our 
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hypothesis.  
Finally, we examine the long run stock responses to earnings announcements. The same 
specifications we used to estimate immediate response and delayed response are employed in 
regression (5)-(8) of Table5. The results are very similar to those of delayed response, with 
smaller coefficients and less statistical significance. Though the magnitude of delayed response 
is bigger than that of immediate response, the size and statistical significance are canceled off by 
immediate response to some extent.  
 
4.4. Results using All Announcements 
4.4.1. Empirical Strategy 
In this section, we use more comprehensive sample to measure the effect of the 
workweek system on stock returns responsiveness to earnings announcements across days of a 
week. We analyze the sensitivity of stock returns to earnings quantiles consisting of four 
quantiles for positive earnings news, one zero quantile for zero earnings surprise and four 
quantiles for negative earnings shocks. This quantile regression was proposed by Cheng et al. 
(1992) to tackle non-linearity problems in unexpected earnings response regression models and 
to mitigate bias from outliers.  
We use OLS to estimate the following quantile regression 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞(𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘)(ℎ,𝐻𝐻) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤      (2) +𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 + Γ0𝑋𝑋𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 + Γ1𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 
 
, where 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 denotes the quantile of earnings surprise for company k in quarter q. We include 
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the same set of controls 𝑋𝑋𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 that we used in equation (1). All these control variables are also 
interacted with earnings surprise quantile to allow different response to earning surprise quantile 
depending on the various characteristics of firms and announcement day. Finally, the set of 
indicators for decile of the number of announcements are included in several specification and 
error terms are clustered within each earnings announcement day in all regressions. We estimate 
equation (2) using three different dependent variables as we did in previous section. In this 
estimation coefficients related to quantile measures the sensitivity of stock return responses to 
one quantile higher earnings news.  
 
4.4.2. Stock Returns Response  
<Table 6 to be Inserted Here> 
Table 6 shows estimated results using all announcements to estimate the impact of 
workweek system on differential impact on immediate, delayed, and long-run stock return 
responses. Overall, results we found using top and bottom quantiles remains strong with reduced 
standard error.  
In regression (1), we estimate equation (2) with immediate return as a dependent 
variable. Estimated coefficients show that there was more immediate response to Friday news 
under the six-day workweek system and while it changes as estimated three-way interaction term 
is significantly negative with larger size (𝛽𝛽7 =-0.004).  
The impact on post-earnings announcement drift is reported in regression (2). Estimated 
𝛽𝛽1 shows statistically significant post-earnings announcement drift while negative 𝛽𝛽4 proves 
that it was lower for Friday news under the six-day workweek system. This pattern is reversed 
under the five-day workweek system as estimated coefficient of three-way interaction term (𝛽𝛽7 =
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0.017) is positive with dominant size. Concerning that average post-earnings announcement 
drift of stocks with positive earnings surprises are 0.009 after 55 trading days in our data, the 
estimated impact of workweek system is quite large and meaningful.  
The estimated results for long-run response are also consistent with previous findings. 
Estimation result in regression (3) implies that the sensitivity of long run return from Friday 
earning news is lower compared to non-Friday news under the six-day workweek system. 
Conversely, the sensitivity of long run return from Friday earnings news is higher than 
non-Friday earnings news under the five-day workweek system. Our results in regression (4)-(6) 
remain consistent where we exclude post-financial crisis period. 
In sum, the transition to the five-day workweek system reversed relative attention given 
to Friday news in the short run and catch-up in long run. This estimated change is consistent 
when we add various control variables or use different specification using all announcements and 
strongly supports our hypothesis that the five-day workweek is related to investor distraction 
during the weekend. 
 
5. The Evidence from Trading Volume 
Evidence from stock returns shows that there was significantly sluggish initial response 
to non-Friday earnings announcements under the six day workweek system and transition to the 
five-day workweek system reversed the trend and created the Friday effect. In this chapter, we 
examine whether we can find similar evidence from trading volume around earnings 
announcement day. If delayed response to earnings announcements is caused by lack of attention, 
then we should be able to find corresponding smaller trading volume around earnings 
announcement day.  
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Examining trading volume will also allow us to exclude some other hypotheses which 
might explain our evidence from stock returns. The more sluggish response to earnings news in 
the short run can be also caused by less accurate forecasts or high disagreement about earnings 
news. If more debatable earnings news is intentionally released on Friday (or non-Friday), then 
we cannot separately identify the effect of investor distraction from the effect of investor 
disagreement. In this case, investigating trading volume can help us to decide the source of the 
estimated effect since greater abnormal trading volume would be observed even though there is 
less immediate response to earnings news if it were caused by investor disagreement rather than 
investor distraction.  
To examine abnormal trading volume around earnings announcement day, we employed 
the change in logarithm of trading volume as a dependent variable. This is to control the 
firm-specific trend in trading volume right before the earnings news. Earnings guidance and 
investor disagreement drive increasing trend of trading volume6 right before the earnings news 
in many firms. To capture the immediate response of trading volume on earnings announcement 
day, we define the abnormal trading volume following Hirshleifer et al (2009) 
 
𝑣𝑣𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘(ℎ,𝐻𝐻) = � ∆ log�𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 �𝐻𝐻 − ℎ + 1 − � ∆ log�𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 �10𝜏𝜏−5
𝑗𝑗=𝜏𝜏−15
𝜏𝜏+𝐻𝐻
𝐽𝐽=𝜏𝜏+ℎ
           (3) 
 
                                                   
6 We employed Dickey-Fuller test found a unit root in many individual volume series in our sample around 
earnings announcement day. 
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, where 𝑉𝑉𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗  is the number of shares traded on day j  and τ  is the date of the earnings 
announcement in quarter q  for company k. 𝑣𝑣𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘(ℎ,𝐻𝐻)  measures abnormal change in trading 
volume during period (τ + h, τ + H). As we are interested in the movement of trading volume 
around earnings announcement day, we use 𝑣𝑣𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘(0,1)  as the immediate abnormal volume change 
which corresponds to immediate stock returns response.  
 
5.1 Empirical Strategy and Regression Results 
To estimate whether the five-day workweek system affected the differential change in 
trading volume across Fridays and non-Fridays, we employ the following OLS specification 
𝑣𝑣𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘(ℎ,𝐻𝐻) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 + 𝛽𝛽3�𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹 × 𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤 � + � 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗9
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 + Γ𝑋𝑋𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘 + 𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘      (4) 
, where 𝑅𝑅𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗  is a dummy variable for each earnings surprise quantile. 𝑋𝑋𝑞𝑞,𝑘𝑘  is a standard set of 
controls which includes year and month indicators for seasonal adjustment, decile of market 
capitalization within each quarter, and number of employees. Firm fixed effects are also included 
to control time invariant characteristics of each firm. Error terms are clustered by date of 
announcements to allow correlations among trading volume whose earnings announcements are 
released on the same day. Since the dependent variable measures the change of the trading 
volume in percentage, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as percentage point change in 
trading volume caused by each independent variable. We also estimate the specifications with the 
value of traded shares as a dependent variable to test robustness of our results. 
<Table 7 to be Inserted Here> 
Table 7 shows the estimated results of equation (4) using number of stocks traded and 
value of stocks traded as a dependent variable. We included firm fixed effects and interacted 
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control variables in all regressions. Results show consistent impact of workweek system on 
Friday effect across period.  
In regression (2), it shows that trading volume on Fridays was 13.4 percentage point 
higher than that to non-Fridays under the six day workweek system. (𝛽𝛽1�=0.134) However, the 
trend is reversed under the five-day workweek system as estimated 𝛽𝛽3�  is significantly negative 
with magnitude greater than 𝛽𝛽1�. (𝛽𝛽3�=-0.157) The results are robustness across specifications and 
alternative measure of trading volume used in regression (4)-(6). It implies that the change in 
attention to earnings news was not focused on penny stocks or high-priced stocks.  
Evidence from changes in trading volume to earnings news supports our results from 
stock returns to earnings news. Again, the change in trading volume is greater for Friday 
earnings announcements under the six day workweek system. In contrast, change in trading 
volume is smaller for Friday earnings announcements under the five-day workweek system. 
These evidences support our hypothesis that the five-day workweek system is a key factor 
causing investor inattention to Friday earnings news.  
 
6 Alternative Explanations and Discussion 
In this section, we discuss other possible interpretations of our findings: after-market 
announcements, pre-announcement release, and firm heterogeneity. We demonstrate that all these 
hypotheses have major inconsistencies with our data even though they can explain parts of our 
findings. 
After-market announcements tend to contain negative news of big firms. Managers have 
an incentive to take advantage of institutional investors' limited opportunity to respond by 
releasing bad news after market close. Empirical evidence has not found any sluggish response 
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to after-market announcements yet in US (Bagnoli, Clement and Watts 2005), however in theory, 
market will not be able to respond well to the information released after market close under 
reasonable assumptions. (Gannette and Trueman 1996)  
Since Bloomberg data does not contain the exact timing of earnings announcement 
release, we randomly selected 10% of our sample and manually matched the data to KIND 
system to identify exact timing of earnings news. The sample shows that the proportion of 
after-market announcements is greater among Friday earnings news throughout our sample 
period. However, the portion of after-market announcements among Friday news sharply 
decreased under the five-day workweek system. It means that the composition of after-market 
news cannot explain our findings from the stock returns and trading volume. Moreover, it would 
have worked in the direction to cancel off our results if it had any effect.  
In Korea, companies are required to report in advance if sales or profit changes more 
than 30% compared to the past year. And some large conglomerates release preliminary earnings 
announcements which contain earnings forecasts of their own. All these announcements contain 
significant information about actual earnings and are relevant to the increasing trend of trading 
volume right before the earnings announcement day.  
If some companies send out more earnings guidance than other companies, then less 
immediate response and smaller trading volume around earnings announcement day will be 
found. However, there also will be less delayed response in stock returns since the earnings 
information is already diffused to the market. Therefore, the significant and robust evidence we 
found from delayed response in stock returns excludes the possibility that the effect of 
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pre-announcement releases is confounded with the effect of the workweek system.  
Firm heterogeneity can also account for the sluggish immediate stock response to 
earnings announcement. For instance, investors may expect that earnings news from large firms 
will have more ripple effect throughout the economy and they may have a greater response. If 
earnings announcements of large firms are concentrated on a specific day, more immediate 
response relative to other days will be observed. Similarly, if some earnings news is considered 
to be transitory and not sustainable in the future, investors will not respond to that news. 
However, these characteristics of firms cannot explain why less immediate responses are 
followed by more delayed responses later.  
There can be other characteristics of firms such as conspicuousness. It would cause both 
less immediate response and more delayed response. These kinds of characteristics are difficult 
to observe, but are likely to be related to the size of the company. Even though we could not fully 
control salient features of each company, our estimated stock returns results are robust when 
including number of employees and market capitalization as control variables.  
 
7. Conclusion 
We found the strong relationship between work schedule of finance sector and investor 
response to Friday earnings announcements relative to non-Friday earnings announcements. 
Unlike Wall Street, financial sector in Korea maintained flat wage system until recently. This 
wage system can be one reason supporting our results. We also suggest that network effect could 
be one driving force behind Friday effect in financial sector. Further research should be followed 
to examine the introduction of incentive system on Friday effect.  
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Figure 1A: The Trends of Monthly Working Days 
 
 
Figure 1B: The Trends of Monthly Working Hours 
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Figure 2 Comparisons of Firm Characteristics by Earning Surprise Quantiles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
5
6
7
8
4
5
6
7
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Five-Day Workweek, Friday Five-Day Workweek, Non-Friday
Six-Day Workweek, Friday Six-Day Workweek, Non-Friday
Quantile of Employee Size Quantile of Market Capitalization
rank
Regression Sample
Distribution of Firm Characteristics
31 
 
Table 1: Changes in Working Hours Regulation in Korea 
 
1953 Establishment of the Labor Standard Act with standard working week 
of 48 hours. 
1989 The Labor Standard Act was revised to standard working week of 44 
hours. 
1998 Labor hours Committee was formed to discuss reduction or standard 
working hours. 
2000 In October, business-union-government agreed to gradual adoption of 
working week of 40 hours. 
2002 In July, banking sector voluntarily initiated working week of 40 hours. 
2002 In November, non-banking sector voluntarily started working week of 
40 hours. 
2003 In August, the National Assembly approved the legislation of working 
week of 40 hours which would be gradually implemented over years. 
2004 In July, corporations with more than 1,000 workers, insurance firms 
and state-invested companies adopted working week of 40 hours. 
2005 In July, corporations with more than 300 workers started working week 
of 40 hours. 
2006 In July, corporations with more than 100 workers embarked working 
week of 40 hours. 
2007 In July, corporations with more than 50 workers implemented working 
week of 40 hours. 
2008 In July, corporations with more than 20 workers accepted working week 
of 40 hours.  
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Table 2 Distribution of Earnings Announcements 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All Monday Tuesday Wed Thu Fri Weekend 
 A. Whole Period  
Number 64,883 14,487 10,103 8,554 11,725 17,158 2,856 
Fraction (%) 100 22.33 15.57 13.18 18.07 26.44 4.41 
 B. Six-day Workweek (2000.1~2002.11) 
Number 6,142 968 1,284 1,066 349 1,994 481 
Fraction (%) 100 15.76 20.91 17.36 5.68 32.46 7.83 
 C. Five-day Workweek (2002.11~2011.12) 
Number 58,741 13,519 8,819 7,488 11,376 15,164 2,375 
Fraction (%) 100 23.01 15.01 12.75 19.37 25.82 4.04 
 D. Our Sample 
Number 8,200 1,128 1,095 1,371 2,094 2,512 Excluded 
Fraction (%) 100 13.76 13.35 16.72 25.54 30.63 0 
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Table 3 Comparison of Average Characteristics of Announcements 
 
Sample: Our basic sample constructed for analysis in chapter 4. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. (* significant at 10%,**significant at 5%, *** significant at 1
A.    Under Six-day Workweek (2000.1-2002.11) 
 Non-Friday 
Announcements 
Friday 
Announcements 
Difference 
Earnings Surprises 3.76 4.35 0.59*** 
(9 Quantiles) (0.19) (0.12) (0.22) 
The Number of Employees  5.63 5.40 -0.23 
(10 Quantiles) (0.27) (0.13) (0.30) 
Market Capitalization 5.68 5.38 -0.30 
(10 Quantiles) (0.25) (0.13) (0.29) 
Share of KSE Announcements 0.68 0.75 0.07 
(KSE/KSE+KOSDAQ) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) 
N 134 456  
B. Under Five-day Workweek (2002.11~2011.12) 
 Non-Fridays Fridays Difference 
Earnings Surprises 4.81 4.60 -0.21*** 
(9 Quantiles) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
The Number of Employees 5.56 5.33 -0.24*** 
(10 Quantiles) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
Market Capitalization 5.55 5.32 -0.24*** 
(10 Quantiles) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
Share of KSE  Announcements 0.64 0.68 0.04*** 
(KSE/KSE+KOSDAQ) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 5741 2207  
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Table 4 Immediate Stock Responses to Earnings Announcements 
(Top 2 and Bottom 2 Quantiles) 
 
Immediate Response 𝑹𝑹𝒒𝒒,𝒌𝒌𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample Periods 2000-2011 2000-2008 
𝛽𝛽1�: Top 2 Quantiles -0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
𝛽𝛽2�: Friday 0.023* 
(0.013)  
0.024* 
(0.014) 
0.022 
(0.013) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
𝛽𝛽3�: Five-Day Workweek 0.016 
(0.016) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
0.012 
(0.019) 
𝛽𝛽4�: Top 2 Quantiles × Friday 0.026** 
(0.013) 
0.026** 
(0.013) 
0.027** 
(0.013) 
0.027** 
(0.014) 
𝛽𝛽5�: Five-Day Workweek× Friday -0.018 
(0.014) 
-0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
𝛽𝛽6� : Top 2 Quantiles × Five −Day Workweek 0.048*** (0.011) 0.047*** (0.012) 0.045*** (0.012) 0.046*** (0.012) 
𝛽𝛽7� : Top 2 Quantiles × Friday ×Five − Day Workweek -0.034*** (0.013) -0.034** (0.014) -0.038*** (0.014) -0.038*** (0.015) 
Controls X X X X 
Interacted Controls X X X X 
Number of Announcements  X  X 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Sample Size 3313 3313 2225 2225 
The standard set of control variables includes indicator of KSE/KOSDAQ, year× month dummy 
variables, decile of employee size, and market capitalization calculated within each quarter. 
Finally, standard errors are clustered by day of announcement to allow correlations of stock 
returns on the same day. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis († significant at 
10%,*significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%) 
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Table 5 Delayed and Long Run Stock Responses to Earnings Announcements 
(Top and Bottom Quantiles) 
Delayed Response 𝑹𝑹𝒒𝒒,𝒌𝒌𝟐𝟐,𝟓𝟓𝟓𝟓 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample Period 2000-2011 2000-2008 
𝛽𝛽1�: Top 2 Quantiles 0.109** 
(0.047) 
0.120** 
(0.048) 
0.106** 
(0.051) 
0.113** 
(0.052) 
𝛽𝛽4�: Top 2 Quantiles× Friday -0.062 
(0.042) 
-0.075* 
(0.042) 
-0.066 
(0.044) 
-0.077* 
(0.044) 
𝛽𝛽6�: Top 2 Quantiles× Five −Day Workweek -0.086** (0.040) -0.010** (0.041) -0.098** (0.043) -0.109** (0.043) 
𝛽𝛽7�: Top 2 Quantiles× Friday ×Five − Day Workweek 0.103** (0.045) 0.117** (0.046) 0.110** (0.050)* 0.121** (0.050) 
Controls X X X X 
Interacted Controls X X X X 
Number of Announcements  X  X 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Sample Size 3286 3286 2169 2169 
Long-Run Response 𝑹𝑹𝒒𝒒,𝒌𝒌𝟎𝟎,𝟓𝟓𝟓𝟓 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Sample Period 2000-2011 2000-2008 
𝛽𝛽1�: Top 2 Quantiles 
 
0.090* 
(0.048) 
0.102** 
(0.049) 
0.091* 
(0.053) 
0.097* 
(0.053) 
𝛽𝛽4�: Top 2 Quantiles× Friday 
 
-0.038 
(0.044) 
-0.051 
(0.044) 
-0.042 
(0.046) 
-0.051 
(0.046) 
𝛽𝛽6� : Top 2 Quantiles × Five −Day Workweek -0.047 (0.042) -0.060 (0.042) -0.061 (0.045) -0.071 (0.044) 
𝛽𝛽7�: Top 2 Quantiles× Friday ×Five − Day Workweek 0.074 (0.048) 0.088* (0.048) 0.079 (0.053) 0.089* (0.052) 
Controls X X X X 
Interacted Controls X X X X 
Number of Announcements  X  X 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Sample Size 3286 3286 2169 2169 
(* significant at 10%,**significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%) 
 
 
36 
 
Table 6 Stock Responses to Earnings Announcements 
(Using All Announcements) 
 
 
Dependent Variable Immediate 
Response 
Delayed 
Response 
Long-Run 
Response 
Immediate 
Response 
Delayed 
Response 
Long-Run 
Response 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Period 2000-2011 2000-2008 
𝛽𝛽1�: Quantile 0.000 
(0.002) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
𝛽𝛽4�: Quantile× Friday 0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
-0.011* 
(0.007) 
𝛽𝛽6�: Quantile× Five − Day Workweek 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.016*** 
(0.006) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.004*** 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
𝛽𝛽7�: Quantile× Friday × Five −Day Workweek -0.004** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.007) 0.015** (0.007) -0.005*** (0.002)* 0.019*** (0.007) 0.016** (0.007) 
Controls X X X X X X 
Interacted Controls X X X X X X 
Number of Announcements X X X X X X 
𝑅𝑅2 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.15 
Sample Size 8200 7862 7862 5537 5204 5204 
(* significant at 10%,**significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%) 
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Table 7 Trading Volume Responses to Earnings Announcements 
(Using All Announcements) 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Number of Stocks Traded Value of Stocks Traded 
Sample Period 2000-2011 2000-2011 Pre-crisis 2000-2011 2000-2011 Pre-crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝛽𝛽1�: Friday 0.120* 
(0.065) 
0.134** 
(0.065) 
0.131** 
(0.067) 
0.125* 
(0.065) 
0.139** 
(0.065) 
0.134** 
(0.066) 
𝛽𝛽2�: Five-Day 
Workweek 
1.610*** 
(0.118) 
1.501*** 
(0.135) 
0.722 
(0.172) 
1.609*** 
(0.120) 
1.487*** 
(0.141) 
0.718*** 
(0.174) 
𝛽𝛽3�: Friday × Five −Day Workweek -0.139** (0.068) -0.157** (0.068) -0.150** (0.072) -0.140** (0.069) -0.157** (0.069) -0.141** (0.072) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Interacted Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of 
Announcements 
 yes yes  yes yes 
Company Fixed 
Effect 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
𝑅𝑅2 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.18 
Sample Size 8166 8166 5503 8166 8166 5503 
(* significant at 10%,**significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
